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Introduction 
 The twenty-fifth anniversary of the promulgation of the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines (OSG) will occur in 2016. In 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission included 
the OSG in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and immediately ushered in a new era for corporate 
compliance programs.1 Because the OSG offers corporations an opportunity for a reduced sentence 
if they are convicted of a federal crime, the promulgation of the OSG led to the widespread 
adoption of compliance programs by corporations, and heavily influenced the structure of those 
programs.2 Today, corporate compliance programs continue to gain importance in the regulation 
of corporate crime. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,3 the Department of Justice’s prosecution 
memos and increased use of non-prosecution and deferred prosecutions agreements in the mid-
2000s,4 and the Dodd-Frank Act following the financial crisis,5 are just a few examples of legal 
developments that have pushed corporations to re-evaluate their compliance programs.  
Despite this growth, the proper place of compliance programs in controlling corporate 
crime remains controversial.  Many legal commentators think the credit for compliance program 
                                                             
1 See infra notes 42 to 52 and accompanying text (discussing the 1991 OSG and its influence on corporate 
compliance programs). 
2 Id. 
3 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just 
Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 597-98 (discussing the Sarbanes Oxley Act disclosure requirements 
for code of ethics for senior officers).  
4 See infra notes 61 to 73 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ enforcement practices, including the use 
of settlement agreements with corporations). 
5 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act provided financial incentives for 
employees to report wrongdoing to the government, but this potentially interfered with compliance 
programs that encouraged employees to report wrongdoing internally. Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? 
The Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Program’s Anti-Retaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 6 TEMP. 
L. REV. 721, 722-25 (2014); Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral 
in the New Era of Dodd- Frank Act "Bounty Hunting, 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 508 (2012). 
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goes too far. For example, some complain that the US Department of Justice (DOJ) gives 
corporations too much credit for their compliance programs when determining whether or not to 
bring criminal charges against the corporation.6 Others argue that corporations are essentially 
being required to adopt compliance programs that are expensive but not effective.7 A third 
contingent believes that the DOJ’s consideration of compliance programs, including the 
corporation’s cooperation with the government’s investigation, creates perverse incentives that 
could actually increase the likelihood of corporate crime due to the scapegoating of employees.8  
More recently, many legal commentators have taken the opposite view and argue that the 
DOJ is not giving corporations enough credit for their investments in their compliance programs. 
These commentators argue that an adequate compliance program should be a defense to a corporate 
crime charge.9 In response to the critics that claim that corporations intentionally adopt ineffective 
compliance programs (so called “paper programs” or “cosmetic compliance”), they state that the 
“sheer size of the compliance industry” shows that corporations cannot be involved in a “bad faith 
attempt at intentional window dressing.”10 
                                                             
6 See William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Why Punish?: Corporate Crime and Making Amends, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1307, 1316-17 (2007) (arguing that larger corporations are able to invest resources in 
compliance programs as a way to “buy their way out of liability.”) 
7 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 487, 492-93 (2003). 
8  William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
1343, 1410-15 (1999). The ability to scapegoat employees creates a moral hazard problem where 
compliance programs (even if ineffective and created solely to appease external stakeholders) provide the 
corporation insurance against criminal prosecution. Id. 
9 See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practice Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WISC. L. 
REV. 609; Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative Defense, 44 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537 (2007); Andrew Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal 
Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 414 (2007).  For criticisms of a compliance defense, see Peter J. 
Henning, Be Careful What You Wish For: Thoughts on a Compliance Defense Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 88 (2012). 
10 Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 952 (2009). 
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At the heart of these debates is the question of whether compliance programs are 
effective?11 And, if compliance programs can be effective, what makes a compliance program 
effective? Corporations want the government to set out clearly what actions (e.g., internal controls 
to implement, policies to adopt, employee trainings to conduct) they must take for the government 
to consider the corporation to have an effective compliance program. The government, however, 
states that there are “no formulaic requirements” for determining an effective compliance 
program.12 This position is based on the belief that simply adopting the basic requirements of a 
compliance program will not be effective unless the corporation manages the organizational 
culture that influences employee behavior.13 
The government has acknowledged the importance of a corporation’s culture for creating 
an effective compliance program. In 2004, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the 
OSG to state that an effective “compliance and ethics program” requires a corporation to “promote 
an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with 
the law.”14 This language was added due to concerns that corporations were adopting “paper 
                                                             
11 See Baer, supra note 10, at 949 (arguing that “It is an open question whether the corporate compliance 
industry . . . has achieved improvements in corporate culture commensurate with its costs.”) 
12 CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICE ACT 56 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf.  
13 Id. at 57. See also David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes Oxley and the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1795-96 (2007) (discussing how an employee 
whistleblowing hotline will not be effective unless the company manages employee attitudes towards the 
company’s response to its use). 
14 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §8B2.1 (2010). 
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programs.” A “paper program” is a compliance program that exists on paper but is not supported 
by the corporate culture and therefore does not meaningfully influence employee behavior.15 
Although there is much confusion on what is meant by a corporation’s culture,16 recently 
there has been a significant increase in attention to these issues. In 2015, the Wall Street Journal 
reported “Culture is the buzzword of the moment at banks—and a puzzle that regulators and Wall 
Street firms are wrestling to solve.”17 An independent investigation of Barclays after its interest 
rate manipulation scandal placed significant blame for that scandal (and the company’s other legal 
problems) on the company’s culture of wanting to win “at all costs,” which made certain 
departments “hostile” to the compliance department.18 JP Morgan Chase issued a report in which 
the company acknowledged its mistakes that resulted in legal problems, and outlined how it 
planned to strengthen its corporate culture.19 The US Department of Treasury Financial Crimes 
                                                             
15 Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The 
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1105-1106 (2006). 
16 See Christie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 679, 716-17 (2009) (noting the differences among corporate monitors on their beliefs on what 
makes up the company’s culture or if it can even be defined).  
17 Emily Glazer & Christina Rexrode, As Regulators Focus on Culture, Wall Street Struggles to Define It, 
WALL ST J, Feb. 2, 2015, at A1.  
18 SALZ REVIEW: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BARCLAYS’ BUSINESS PRACTICE 82, 88 (2013), available 
online at: http://www.euromoney.com/downloads/2013/Barclays-Salz-review.pdf. The Salz Report found 
that Barclays was a company without a common set of values. Id. at 81.  Instead, each subunit developed 
their own values, which were typically based on what was important to that unit’s leader. Id. at 81-82. The 
values focused on “winning and commercial drive” taken to the extreme of winning “at all costs.” Id. at 82. 
In the Retail and Business Banking division, the Salz Report noted a “material shift from client focus to 
one that valued scale and financial performance.” Id. at 88. Employees felt powerless to question any new 
financial targets due to a “culture of fear.” Id. In addition, employees believed that “senior management did 
not want to hear bad news and that employees should be capable of solving problems.” Id. at 8. Citing an 
internal employee survey, the Salz Report notes that “A significant proportion of employees in the 
investment bank . . . said that they were ‘reluctant to report problems to management,’ and that they did not 
feel able to ‘report unethical behaviour without fear of reprisal.’” Id. at 157-58. This prevented management 
and the board from having the information they needed to react to developing problems at the bank. 
19 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., HOW WE DO BUSINESS – THE REPORT 5 (2014)   available online at: 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/4090721795x0x799950/14aa6d4f-f90d-4a23-96a6-
53e5cc199f43/How_We_Do_Business.pdf 
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Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an advisory stating that recent anti-money laundering 
enforcement actions demonstrated that “the culture of an organization is critical to its 
compliance.”20 In the United Kingdom, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) stated that one of 
the five areas its governance team will focus on in 2015 is company culture and “how best to assess 
culture and practices and embed good corporate behaviour throughout companies.”21 The 
chairman of the FRC wrote an opinion article titled “Why it’s time boards faced up to the corporate 
culture challenge.”22 
Despite this increased attention to corporate culture and creating a “culture of compliance” 
within corporations, compliance programs and culture are often treated separately rather than as 
two sides of the same coin. Corporations focus on the technical aspects of a compliance program 
and then separately address the “soft” issues of corporate culture. This view has been fostered by 
discussions within the academic literature that corporations can implement their compliance 
program through either a “command-and-control” approach focused on surveillance and sanction, 
                                                             
20 US DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FINCEN, ADVISORY: 
ADVISORY TO U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON PROMOTING A CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE, FIN-2014-
A007, Aug. 11, 2014, available online at: http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-
A007.pdf 
21 FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STEWARDSHIP IN 
2014 23 (2015), available one at: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-
Governance/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-and-Stewardsh.pdf 
22 Sir Winfried Bischoff, Why it’s time boards faced up to the corporate culture challenge, CITY AM, Jan. 
12, 2015, available online at: http://www.cityam.com/206870/why-it-s-time-boards-faced-corporate-
culture-challenge. Bischoff asked the question of “Where does the responsibility lie for ensuring ethical 
corporate behaviour, and who is accountable when culture is found to be at fault?” He answered that 
question by pointing to the FRC’s UK Corporate Governance Code (which was revised in 2014) which 
places those responsibilities with the board of directors. Id. The Corporate Governance Code states, “One 
of the key roles for the board includes establishing the culture, values and ethics of the company.” 
FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 2 (2014), available online at: 
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-
2014.pdf  
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or an “integrity” approach focused on values.23 Lost in this “either/or” approach is the recognition 
that compliance programs and corporate culture cannot be separated; each impacts the other. A 
strong compliance program may be necessary to make up for a weak ethical culture,24 and over 
time may help create a strong ethical culture.25 A weak compliance program can push a corporation 
towards a weak ethical culture.26 
This Article explains why there is this gap in our understanding of how compliance 
programs and corporate culture are related, and the harms this lack of understanding can cause in 
practice. Bringing together the latest research in behavioral and organizational ethics, this Article 
presents a model of an organization’s ethical infrastructure.  This model integrates, rather than 
separates, the ideas of compliance and an ethical corporate culture. It shows how a corporation 
must align it compliance program and corporate culture to create an ethical infrastructure that has 
legitimacy in the eyes of employees. Without legitimacy, the program will be ineffective, and 
potentially create more unethical behavior than before the program was rolled-out. A so-called 
“paper program” is not necessarily a “bad faith attempt at intentional window dressing,”27 but may 
be a program that is misaligned with the company’s culture and has lost legitimacy. This model 
shows that a corporation—even one acting in good faith—that adopts the technical aspects of a 
                                                             
23 See infra note 138 to 147 and accompanying text (describing Paine’s two approaches to implementing a 
compliance program). 
24 Kristin Smith-Crowe et al., The Ethics “Fix”: When Formal Systems Make a Difference, J. BUS. ETHICS 
(forthcoming), at *2. 
25 Muel Kaptein, Ethics Programs and Ethical Culture: Next Steps in Unraveling their Multi-Faceted 
Relationship, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 261, 277 (2009). 
26 See infra notes 225 to 248 and accompanying text (presenting academic research finding that a weakly 
implemented compliance program can cause the program to lose legitimacy with employees, and ultimately 
lead to an increase in wrongdoing).  
27 Baer, supra note 10, at 952. 
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compliance program but does not attend to the organization’s informal systems and ethical climate 
will not be successful in encouraging ethical behavior.  
The ethical infrastructure model can be incorporated into the OSG with two short 
amendments that have the potential to catalyze significant positive change. The changes will help 
provide clarity and legitimacy to the issue of corporate culture for compliance officers, boards of 
directors, executives, prosecutors, and others. Although the literature on behavioral ethics is too 
voluminous to discuss here,28 this Article uses current research directly related to the ethical 
infrastructure model to inform those groups and push forward an understanding of corporate 
compliance and corporate culture as an interrelated evolving journey, rather than a final end state.  
This Article proceeds by discussing the evolution of compliance and ethics programs under 
United States law in Part I. This includes a discussion of the criticisms of the OSG, and the 
Sentencing Commission’s response to those criticisms. In Part II, the Article shows that although 
corporations have enacted changes in response to the OSG’s amendments, significant hurdles still 
stand in the way for corporations to integrate their compliance programs with their corporate 
culture. Part III presents the ethical infrastructure model and the empirical support for this model 
from the latest research in behavioral and organizational ethics. This includes a discussion of the 
factors that influence when a compliance program can increase intrinsic, moral motivation for 
employees to comply with the law and company rules, rather than simply provide extrinsic 
motivation. This part also discusses the harmful effects of a weakly implemented compliance 
program. Finally, Part IV proposes two amendments to the OSG to provide a foundation for 
                                                             
28 For overviews of different aspects of this literature, see, e.g., Robert Prentice, Behavioral Ethics: Can it 
Help Lawyers (and Others) to be Their Best Selves?, 29 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 35 (2015); Max H. 
Bazerman and Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Moral Judgment 
and Dishonesty, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85 (2012). 
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incorporating the ethical infrastructure model into current conceptions of compliance and ethics 
programs.  
 
I. The Evolution of Compliance and Ethics Programs under United States Law 
The use of corporate compliance programs to manage legal risks developed under various areas 
of the law until the OSG provided a more centralized focus in 1991.  Prior to 1991, compliance 
programs developed to manage legal risks in specific areas, such as antitrust law, bribery of foreign 
officials, insider trading, and fraud in the defense contracting industry.29 As described below, in 
the almost twenty-five years since the OSG, compliance programs have continued to evolve and 
take on greater importance in the law. 
 
A. The Emergence of Compliance Programs under US Law 
Spurred by anti-trust litigation in the early 1960s, Corporations adopted compliance programs 
to help protect against legal violations.30 Although the compliance programs would not provide a 
legal defense against liability, high-profile enforcement actions encouraged corporations to adopt 
the programs to manage their legal risks.31 These programs spread quickly, and were credited with 
                                                             
29 See John D. Copeland, The Tyson Story: Building an Effective Ethics and Compliance Program, 5 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 305, 313-18 (2000); Ford & Hess, supra note 16, at 689-90 Joan T. A. Gabel et al., 
Letter vs. Spirit: The Evolution of Compliance into Ethics, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 453, 457-462 (2009); Harvey 
L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at 
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1578-96 (1990). 
30 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 29, at 1578-82. 
31 Id. at 1580. 
 
 
11 
 
preventing many antitrust violations by increasing employees’ understanding of antitrust law 
enforcement.32 
Another early catalyst for compliance programs was the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977 
(FCPA).33 In addition to criminalizing the use of corrupt payments to foreign officials to obtain 
business, the FCPA also requires corporations to maintain accurate accounting records and to 
adopt appropriate internal controls to ensure that the corporation is not making corrupt payments.34 
These internal control provisions led to many corporations adopting codes of conduct and other 
aspects of modern-day compliance programs.35  
The next major development occurred in the mid-1980s when President Reagan appointed a 
commission to investigate allegations of fraud in the defense industry.36 The commission’s report 
included the recommendation that the defense contractors should seek to self-regulate through the 
adoption of codes of conduct, internal controls, and other compliance program mechanisms.37 In 
addition, to encourage better self-regulation, the Department of Defense stated that it would 
consider the quality of a contractor’s compliance program, including self-disclosure of 
wrongdoing, as a mitigating factor in any debarment decision that followed a criminal conviction.38  
                                                             
32 Id. at 1581. 
33 Id. at 1582 (1990). Prior to the FCPA, litigation in antitrust law in 1960s spurred the spread of compliance 
programs focused on antitrust matters. Id. at 1578-82. 
34 Id. at 1585. 
35 Id. at 1585. 
36 Copeland, supra note 29, at 315-16. As part of its investigation, the commission conducted a survey to 
better understand the general public’s opinion of the defense industry. The survey showed that fifty percent 
of Americans believed that that the government lost half of its defense budget to fraud and waste. Id.  
37 Ford & Hess, supra note 16, at 689-90; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 29, at 1594-95. 
38 Ford & Hess, supra note 16, at 690; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 29, at 1595. 
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Also in the 1980s, after several insider trading scandals involving major Wall Street investment 
banks, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 
(ITSFEA).39 The Act required broker-dealers to adopt policies and procedures to prevent the use 
on nonpublic information, and to enforce and regularly update those policies and procedures.40 
The Act also sought to incentivize banks to adopt more rigorous compliance programs by 
increasing the potential penalties for the bank under control person liability.41 
 
B. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines of 1991 
The greatest incentive for corporations to adopt compliance programs came in 1991 when the 
US Sentencing Commission amended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to include what are 
commonly known as the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) or the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO).42 The intent of the inclusion of the OSG in the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines was to reduce the discretion of individual judges and have an administrative 
                                                             
39 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 29, at 1589-90. 
40 Id. at 1591. 
41 Marc. I. Steinberg & John Fletcher, Compliance Programs for Insider Trading, 47 SMU L. REV. 1783, 
1788-89 (1994). 
42 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States Sentencing Commission and gave it 
authority to develop and promulgate guidelines for federal district court judges to use to determine 
sentences for those convicted of federal crimes. Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some 
Thoughts About their Future, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 205, 205-207 (1993).  In 1987, the Commission 
promulgated guidelines for the sentencing of individual offenders, and then turned its attention to the 
sentencing of organizations.  Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A 
Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 699-701 (2002). 
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body create a uniform sentencing policy.43 The OSG, however, has gone beyond that and has had 
a far-reaching impact on organizations.44 
The OSG adopted what may be termed a “carrots and sticks” approach.45 The OSG created a 
carrot by giving a convicted organization a significantly reduced fine if the organization had 
adopted an effective compliance program.46 If the organization had not adopted a compliance 
program, however, it would not receive a mitigated sentence and would be placed on probation.47  
Not surprisingly, the promulgation of the OSG was followed by a significant increase in the 
adoption of compliance programs.48 The OSG also directly influenced the structure and content of 
compliance programs by stating what was required for a court to consider the organization to have 
an effective compliance program. The OSG listed seven basic requirements (the “seven steps”) 
that were purposefully not overly detailed to provide corporations with some flexibility.49 Briefly, 
those seven requirements were:50 
                                                             
43 Nagel & Swenson, supra note 42, at 207. 
44 Murphy, supra note 42, at 698-99. 
45 Nagel & Swenson, supra note 42, at 228. 
46 Id. at 237; see also Dove Izraeli & Mark Schwartz, What Can We Learn From the U.S. Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizational Ethics?, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1045, 1047 (1998) (LISTING VARIOUS SURVEYS 
SHOWING THE LARGE PERCENTAGE OF CORPORATIONS THAT EITHER ADOPTED A COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 
OR SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED THEIR COMPLIANCE PROGRAM UPON AWARENESS OF THE 1991 OSG). 
47 Nagel & Swenson, supra note 42, at 237. The OSG also rewarded organizations for post-offense activity, 
such as disclosing the offense to the government and cooperating in the government’s investigation. Id.  
48 See Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid-1990’s: An Empirical Study of the 
Fortune 1000, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 283, 286 & 289 (1999) (NOTING PERIODS OF SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN 
THE ADOPTION OF CODES OF ETHICS AND ETHICS OFFICES, FOR EXAMPLE, IN YEARS FOLLOWING THE OSG). 
49 Matthew J. Merrick, Sentencing Commission Takes on Corporate Crime, 8 FED. SENT. R. 238, 238 
(1996). 
50 Murphy, supra note 42, at 703-704; Molly E. Joseph, Organizational Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1017, 1027-31 (1998). 
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1. The corporation must establish standards and procedures designed to reduce the risk of 
criminal conduct. 
2. The compliance program must be overseen by high-level personnel. 
3. The corporation should not grant substantial discretionary authority to any individual 
that has a propensity to engage in criminal conduct. 
4. The organization’s standards and procedures must be communicated to all employees. 
5. The corporation must enforce its program, and may ensure compliance with its 
standards and procedures through monitoring and auditing systems, and means for 
employees to report wrongdoing without risk of retribution. 
6. The organization must consistently enforce its standards. 
7. Any violation of the program should be followed with appropriate disciplinary action 
and updating of the program as necessary.  
The Sentencing Commission did not intend for those seven steps to be the final say on 
compliance programs.51 Instead, the Sentencing Reform Act expected to Commission to monitor 
its guidelines for areas of improvement and to amend the guidelines as necessary.52 As discussed 
below, the Commission has amended the OSG twice,53 and this Article argues that the Commission 
should do so again based on the relevant empirical research.54 
 
                                                             
51 Nagel & Swenson, supra note 42, at 251-52. 
52 Id. 
53 See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined. to 119 and accompanying text. 
54 See infra Part IV. 
 
 
15 
 
C. Caremark and the DOJ Prosecution Practices 
In the late 1990s, the Delaware courts and the Department of Justice (DOJ) took actions that 
further increased the importance of the OSG and its seven steps for an effective compliance 
program. In 1996, in the case of In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the 
Delaware Chancery Court stated that the board of directors has an obligation to ensure that the 
corporation has systems in place to monitor its compliance with the law.55 Furthermore, the board 
should strive to take advantage of the mitigated sentence for an effective compliance program 
offered by the OSG.56  These statements, though dicta,57 established the idea that there is an 
“affirmative duty on a board to create some kind of compliance mechanism.”58 Although a 
director’s actual potential for liability under Caremark may be very low,59 the ruling helped keep 
corporate compliance programs on corporate boards’ agendas.60 
 In 1999, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum outlining a policy 
for federal prosecutors to follow when making charging decisions against corporations.61 The 
factors for prosecutors to consider included the nature and seriousness of the offense, the 
                                                             
55 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
56 Id.  
57 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 973 (2009). 
58 Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 691 (2004). 
59 Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 69 BUS. LAW. 107, 120 (2013-14) (stating that “a board 
Caremark duty is relatively low”). In the Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 
(Del. 2006), the Delaware Supreme Court approved the Caremark claim and indicated that a director would 
have liability if they failed to establish any form of compliance program or knowingly failed to correct a 
specific program with an existing compliance program. Id. at 120-22.  
60 Elson & Gyves, supra note 58, at 692;  Baer, supra note 10, at 967. 
61 Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporation” Charging Policy 
in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What that Means for the Purposes of Federal Criminal Sanction, 
51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 37 (2014). 
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pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, the corporation’s history of similar conduct, 
and the corporation’s voluntary disclosure of the wrongdoing.62 In addition, the memo required 
prosecutors to consider the “existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program.”63 
The memo encouraged prosecutors to “determine whether a corporation’s compliance program is 
merely a ‘paper program’ or whether it was designed and implemented in an effective manner.”64 
The memo specifically directed prosecutors to the OSG for a review of compliance program factors 
to consider.65 In addition, the memo encouraged prosecutors to look at the pervasiveness of 
misconduct in the organization and its past history of misconduct as evidence that management 
created a “corporate culture that encouraged, or at least condoned, such conduct, regardless of any 
compliance programs.”66 The charging memo went through various iterations under subsequent 
Deputy Attorneys General until it was published in the United States Attorney’s Manual.67 
However, guidance on compliance programs and the discussion of corporate culture has not 
changed.68 Overall, due to the DOJ’s charging policy, corporations would not just receive a 
reduced sentence for having an effective compliance in program in place, but could avoid 
prosecution altogether.   
                                                             
62 MEMORANDUM FROM ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TO ALL 
COMPONENT HEADS & U.S. ATTORNEYS 3 (June 16, 1999), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response2-appx-k.pdf. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 8. 
65 Id. at 8 and 13 n.5. 
66 Id. at 5. 
67 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations.  
68 O’Sullivan, supra note 61, at 36-43. The main changes to the charging policy related to limiting 
prosecutors’ requests for attorney-client privilege waivers and prosecutors considering the corporation’s 
payment of an employee’s attorney fees as lack of cooperation. Id. 
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The ability to avoid prosecution became a more attainable option when the DOJ increased their 
use of settlement agreements with corporations.69 These agreements, known as either deferred 
prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), allow corporations to 
avoid prosecution in exchange for an agreement to admit the wrongdoing, pay a specified fine, and 
adopt various reform measures, such as an improved compliance program designed to prevent 
recurrence of the offense.70  
These settlement agreements are controversial. Some critics believe that these settlement 
agreements cause corporations to admit to wrongdoing even when prosecutors have weak cases.71  
Others view them as too lenient, and believe that corporations should be prosecuted.72 Either belief, 
however, encourages corporations to attempt to adopt at least the appearance of an effective 
compliance program. If a corporation is pressured into a settlement agreement (even if unfairly, as 
some critics claim), an effective compliance program may allow it to receive more favorable terms, 
such as not being required to hire an independent monitor. If, as other critics claim, the settlement 
agreements are too readily agreed to by prosecutors, then a corporation will want to be able to 
                                                             
69 These DOJ began to use these settlement agreements in the mid-1990s, and increased their use in the 
early 2000s. For an early history of deferred prosecution agreements, see F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. 
Schwartz, Deferred Prosecution: The Need for Specialized Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J. 
CORP. L. 121, 123-32 (1997).  
70 For an overview of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, including their history and 
range of settlement terms, see Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993−2013, 70 BUS. LAWYER 61 
(2014); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK 
ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf. 
71 Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An Empirical 
Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 
539-40 (2015). 
72 Id. at 538-39. 
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point to its compliance program to help it take advantage of this option to avoid prosecution under 
the DOJ’s charging policy.  
In addition to encouraging the adoption of compliance programs, settlement agreements also 
influence the structure of those programs. Because the settlement agreements are available to the 
public, the terms of each settlement agreement provides new information to corporations on what 
the DOJ views as an effective program.73 Overall, boards’ fiduciary duties and the DOJ’s 
enforcement practices have made compliance programs a central element of corporate governance, 
and an element that must be continually monitored and updated.   
 
D. Criticisms of the OSG and Enforcement Practices 
 
During the time of the increased use of settlement agreements, commentators criticized the 
DOJ’s, and other government agencies’, consideration of corporations’ compliance programs in 
their enforcement decisions. Some of this criticism was fueled by the corporate scandals of Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco, and others, that occurred after the OSG. Rather than respond to these scandals 
with an even increased emphasis on compliance programs, these critics wanted to challenge “the 
belief that pouring more resources into internal compliance structures will cure what ails corporate 
America.”74  
                                                             
73 See White & Case, LLP, New Guidance for Compliance Programs in Recent Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, July, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-guidance-for-compliance-
programs-in-79151 (stating that “Settlement agreements, non-prosecution agreements and deferred 
prosecution agreements have been primary sources of guidance from the US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
on the components of an effective corporate compliance program.”).  
74 Krawiec, supra note 7, at 489. More colorfully, Bowman argues:  
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Professor Krawiec, for example, voiced concerns that the reliance on compliance programs in 
enforcement decisions leads to an under-deterrence of corporate misconduct because corporations 
can easily mimic having an effective compliance program—and thus receive the benefits offered 
by prosecutors—without actually reducing its level of misconduct (because the adopted 
compliance program is in fact ineffective).75 Krawiec also argued that compliance programs lead 
to a waste of corporate resources because all corporations are adopting compliance programs that 
meet the OSG’s requirements even if (1) there is no evidence the programs work; and (2) the 
corporation is committed to preventing misconduct but does so through other means.76  
Krawiec’s arguments were based on her claim that there is no evidence that compliance 
programs are effective.77 At the time of her writing, however, there was limited empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of compliance programs. First, Krawiec pointed to the lack of evidence that 
adopting a code of ethics reduced misconduct.78 This criticism is somewhat misleading, however, 
as the OSG has never simply required the adoption of a code of ethics, and instead, requires the 
presence of the other features of an effective compliance program. Second, Krawiec reviewed the 
research on OSG compliance programs, but she was only able to identify three studies on 
                                                             
 [T]he portion of the organizational sentencing guidelines devoted to compliance programs 
seems awfully like a legal Potemkin village. It looks great as the Tsarina sails by on her 
barge. It has made a bundle of money for the compliance officers and outside consultants 
who have been busily constructing the facade. But there is precious little evidence that all 
this scurrying about on the riverbank has moved either the barons or the serfs of corporate 
life to commit less crime. 
Frank O. Bowman III, Drifting Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical 
Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing, 39 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 671, 674-75 (2004) (citations omitted). 
75 Krawiec, supra note 7, at 491-92. 
76 Id. at 492-93. 
77 Id. at 510. 
78 Id. at 511-12. 
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compliance programs and those studies did not find support for the hypothesis that compliance 
programs reduce corporate misconduct.79  
Professor Laufer also focused on the idea that corporations could mimic an effective 
compliance due to prosecutors’ inability to distinguish “paper programs” from compliance 
programs that were implemented in good faith.80 Laufer pointed out that the inability of regulators 
to identify truly effective compliance programs “is made far much worse by the fact that 
corporations are all too aware of this fact.”81  This problem allows corporations to receive favorable 
treatment from prosecutors by hiding behind their compliance programs and placing blame on the 
employees that committed the acts.82 Thus, corporations have no incentive to try to actually 
improve their compliance programs.83 Instead, corporations have an incentive to treat compliance 
programs as insurance; the corporation purchases compliance program structures sufficient to 
insure that “employee infidelity will be viewed as an individual, rather than a corporate act.”84 
Corporations will “purchase” the minimum level of compliance necessary to shift blame of 
misconduct onto its employees.85 Not only does this encourage the adoption of “paper 
programs”—that is, compliance programs that exist primarily on paper and not in practice—but it 
                                                             
79 Id. at 512-14.  
80 William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1343, 1390-91 (1999). 
81 Id. at 1418. 
82 Id. at 1371-72. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1402-3. 
85 Id. at 1403. 
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may actually increase misconduct, as the corporation now has insurance against that risk of loss 
due to liability for the misconduct.86 
 
E. The 2004 and 2010 Amendments to the OSG 
The Sentencing Commission made significant amendments to the OSG in 2004.87 The hearings 
that led these changes were motivated by the corporate scandals of Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and 
others. These scandals strongly suggested that the existing approach to self-regulation through 
compliance programs was not working and changes needed to be made. 
At the hearing for the 2004 amendments, some experts pushed the Commission to go farther 
than it did in 1991 by including consideration of ethics. One such proponent was Dov Seidman, 
the CEO of Legal Research Network (LRN), a compliance and ethics consulting company. 
Seidman expressed the need for the OSG to encourage corporations to create a culture that 
                                                             
86 Id. at 1405-6. This is the moral hazard problem that potentially arises with any purchase of insurance. Id. 
Laufer describes managerial support for misconduct as “winking.” Id. at 1410-15. That is, management 
professes a commitment to ethics, but “winks” at misconduct by knowingly tolerating it and/or implicitly 
rewarding employees that engage in such behavior. Id. In summary, Laufer describes the process as follows:  
The purchase of compliance sufficient to shift the risk of liability and loss, in certain firms, has the 
effect of decreasing levels of care. Decreased levels of care with a top management that winks 
fosters an environment of tacit acceptance of illegalities. This acceptance, coupled with the constant 
pressure on middle management to produce results, has led to increased deviance throughout the 
corporate hierarchy. The purchase of compliance for purposes of liability shifting and cost 
internalization results in a redefinition of this deviance. Acts that were once held to be those of the 
firm, now remain those of individual employees. 
Id. at 1415 (footnotes omitted). 
87 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines 35-38 & 47-48 (Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Advisory Group Report], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/advgrprpt/AG_FINAL.pdf. 
The decision to empanel an Advisory Group to review the OSG was made prior to the major scandals. Id. 
at 35. 
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encourages commitment not just to the law, but also to ethics.88 He described the difference as 
instilling in employees “a commitment to doing the right thing, not simply the required thing.”89 
Without the inclusion of ethics, Seidman argued, the OSG “runs the risk of its guidelines fostering 
the same types of corporate cultures that allowed individuals to seek out "loopholes" in the law 
that led to many of the recent corporate crises.”90 
In response to such criticisms, the Sentencing Commission amended the OSG to specifically 
refer to “compliance and ethics programs” (emphasis added).91 In addition to including the term 
“ethics,” the OSG was amended to state that an effective compliance and ethics program requires 
that the organization shall “(1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; and 
(2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment 
to compliance with the law.”92 Subsection (1) is essentially the same as the 1991 OSG, where due 
diligence was described as the seven steps for an effective compliance program. Subsection (2), 
does two things. First, it requires the consideration of an organization’s culture and not just the 
technical implementation of the compliance program. Second, it follows Siedman’s advice, and it 
requires that the culture not just promote “compliance with the law,” but also “ethical conduct.”  
                                                             
88 Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n  1 (Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearing] 
(testimony of Dov L. Seidman, Chief Executive Officer, Legal Research Network), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20040317-
19/Seidman-LRN.pdf. 
89 Id. at 2. 
90 Id. at 5. 
91 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2010). 
92 Id. 
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Unfortunately, the 2004 OSG did not define “organizational culture.” The Advisory Group 
Report, however, provides some additional information on the Committee’s thought process. The 
report stated that: 
In general, organizational culture, in this context, has come to be defined as the 
shared set of norms and beliefs that guide individual and organizational behavior. 
These norms and beliefs are shaped by the leadership of the organization, are often 
expressed as shared values or guiding principles, and are reinforced by various 
systems and procedures throughout the organization.93 
However, the Advisory Group Report went on to state that: 
It is important to note, however, that this recommendation will not impose upon 
organizations anything more than the law requires . . . . It is also intended to avoid 
requiring prosecutors to litigate and judges to determine whether an organization 
has a good “set of values” or appropriate “ethical standards,” subjects which are 
very difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate in an objective, consistent manner.94 
                                                             
93 Advisory Group Report, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 52. 
94 Id. at 53. Later, the Report states: 
An organizational culture that encourages a commitment to compliance with the law 
includes positive actions which demonstrate that law compliance is a key value within the 
organization. Such a culture is demonstrated by organizational actions which encourage 
employees to choose lawful behaviors and to expect that their conduct will be evaluated by 
others within the organization in terms of how well the employees have pursued lawful 
conduct. 
Id. at 55. 
 
 
24 
 
In the end, the OSG simply refers to the seven requirements for an effective compliance and ethics 
program as also promoting “an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a 
commitment to compliance with the law.”95 
The Commission also made significant changes to those seven requirements for an effective 
compliance and ethics program.96 One of the most important changes was to specify the roles of 
organizational leadership.97 First, the “governing authority” (for a corporation, that would be the 
board of directors) must be “knowledgeable” about the program and should “exercise reasonable 
oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness” of the program.98 Second, a 
specific individual (or individuals) within “high-level personnel” (e.g., an executive or head of a 
major business function99) “shall be assigned overall responsibility for the program.”100 Finally, a 
specific person should be given day-to-day operational responsibility for the program.101 For a 
                                                             
95 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b). 
96 For a review of the changes, see Paul Fiorelli & Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational 
Guidelines Offer a Safer Harbor in the Storm, 32 J. CORP. L. 467, 482-89 (2007); David Hess et al., The 
2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration 
of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 740-46 (2006); Julie R. O’Sullivan, Some 
Thoughts on Proposed Revisions to the Organizational Guidelines, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 504-14 
(2004). 
97 Hess et al., supra note 96, at 741. 
98 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (2010). 
99 The commentary defines “high-level personnel” as:  
individuals who have substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial 
role in the making of policy within the organization.  The term includes: a director; an 
executive officer; an individual in charge of a major business or functional unit of the 
organization, such as sales, administration, or finance; and an individual with a substantial 
ownership interest. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.2, commentary note 3. 
100 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B) (2010). 
101 Id. at § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C). 
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large organization, this would be the Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer (CECO).102 The OSG 
also requires that this individual report on the program’s effectiveness to “high-level personnel 
and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the governing 
authority.”103 The organization should grant this individual with “adequate resources, appropriate 
authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup.”104 
A second important change related to an organization’s responsibility to promote and enforce 
its program. As with the 1991 OSG, the organization should enforce the program through 
“appropriate disciplinary measures” for those engaging in criminal conduct, as well as those that 
“fail[]to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.”105 Under the 2004 OSG, 
however, the organization should not just focus on sanctioning those engaging in misconduct, but 
also provide incentives for employees to follow the program.106 
A third important change was the general requirement that the organization periodically assess 
the risk of criminal conduct and modify the program as needed.107 Under the 1991 OSG, the 
organization was only required to modify its program in response to a failure. The change makes 
explicit what the Commission thought was implied in the 1991 OSG.108 In addition, the provision 
was intended to avoid the problem of a “paper program”; by requiring the organization to evaluate 
                                                             
102 Hess et al., supra note 96, at 742. 
103 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §8B2.1(b)(2)(C). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at §8B2.1(b)(6). 
106 Id. The Advisory group report referred to these as “positive incentives.” Advisory Group Report, supra 
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 86. 
107 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §8B2.1(c) (2010). 
108 O’Sullivan, supra note 96, at 504. 
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the program’s effectiveness, the organization would not be able to let the program “gather dust in 
desk drawers.”109 
The Commission believed that the changes would “lead to a new era in corporate 
compliance.”110 Under the 2004 OSG, the minimum seven steps for an effective compliance and 
ethics program, and “the promotion of an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct 
and a commitment to compliance with the law” are as follows:111 
(1) “The organization shall establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal 
conduct.” 
(2) The governing authority should have knowledge of the program and “exercise reasonable 
oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness . . . .” Overall responsibility 
for the program should be assigned to “high-level personnel” and the person will day-to-
day responsibility for the program should “be given adequate resources, appropriate 
authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup of the 
governing authority.” 
(3) No person should be placed “within the substantial authority personnel of the organization” 
if they have engaged in illegal activities or other conduct inconsistent with the program. 
(4) Conduct effective training programs for individuals at all levels of the organization, 
including agents. 
                                                             
109 Id. at 506. 
110 News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Commission Tightens Requirements for Corporate Compliance 
and Ethics Programs 1 (May 3, 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/news/press-releases-and-news-
advisories/may-3-2004.  
111 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b). 
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(5) The organization should ensure employees are following the program by “monitoring and 
auditing to detect criminal conduct,” test the effectiveness of the program, and ensure that 
employees are aware of mechanisms to “report or seek guidance regarding potential or 
actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.” 
(6) The company should use incentives to ensure compliance with the program, and use 
“appropriate disciplinary measures” for “engaging in criminal conduct and for failing to 
take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.” 
(7) In response to any criminal conduct that is detected, the company should modify the 
program as necessary to prevent similar conduct in the future. 
The Sentencing Commission again amended the OSG in 2010. Those changes, however, did 
not directly change the seven requirements for an effective compliance and ethics program. 
Indirectly, the amendments elevated the importance of having a Chief Ethics and Compliance 
Officer (or similar role).112 Prior to the amendments, the organization would be denied favorable 
treatment for having an effective compliance and ethics program in place at the time of the 
wrongdoing if high level personnel (or a person with “substantial authority”) “participated in, 
condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense.”113 Under the amendments, the organization 
would not be denied the favorable treatment if it can show all of the following: 
                                                             
112 The 2010 Amendments made two significant changes. The first change is discussed in the text of this 
Article. The second made changes to the commentary with respect to how an organization should respond 
to wronging. Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 66 Bus. Lawyer 125, 125-26 (2010). Under 
the amendments, the organization should not just modify its compliance program, but should also consider 
other responses, such as providing restitution to the victims and self-reporting the wrongdoing to 
authorities. Id. at 126. This article will not further discuss these amendments.  
113 Id. at 127. 
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1. “[T]he individual or individuals with operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics 
program have direct reporting obligations to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup 
thereof.” 
2. The organization discovered the offense through the compliance and ethics program before 
it was discovered (or reasonably likely to be discovered) by an external party.114 
3. “[T]he organization promptly reported the offense to the appropriate governmental 
authorities.”115 
4. “[N]o individual with operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program 
participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense.”116 
Thus, whereas the seven requirements of a compliance and ethics program indicated that the 
CECO should have “direct access” to the governing authority (e.g., the board of directors) or a 
subgroup thereof,117 the 2010 Amendments encourage corporations to give the CECO direct 
reporting obligations. The commentary defines “direct reporting” as when the “individual has 
express authority to communicate personally to the governing authority or appropriate subgroup 
thereof (A) promptly on any matter involving criminal conduct or potential criminal conduct, and 
(B) no less than annually on the implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics 
program.”118  Thus, the CECO should not just have the ability to report misconduct to the board 
                                                             
114 Id. at § 8C2.5(f)(3)(c)(ii). 
115 Id. at § 8C2.5(f)(3)(c)(iii). 
116 Id. at § 8C2.5(f)(3)(c)(iv). 
117 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(c).  
118 Id. at § 8C2.5, commentary note 11. 
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of directors, but should have formal, written authority to provide in-person reports to the board (or 
subcommittee) on a regular basis.119 
Overall, the 2004 and 2010 amendments to the OSG sought to prevent the adoption of “paper 
programs” by including an organization’s culture as a part of a compliance and ethics program, 
and by elevating the role of the CECO and requiring greater involvement by the board of directors 
and certain executives. As seen in the next Part, however, these changes did not go far enough and 
require further amendments to achieve their goals. 
 
II. The More Compliance Programs Change, the More They Stay the Same 
Since OSG started a sea change in compliance programs across corporate America in 1991, 
it has undergone significant changes to encourage corporations to look beyond simply putting 
policies and procedures on paper, and to encourage corporations to consider the culture that 
influences ethical behavior and to empower the CECOs that run those programs. In response, 
corporations are making changes. For example, recent surveys of compliance professionals show 
that CECOs are gaining greater access to the CEO and board of directors.120 However, despite 
these structural changes, there appears to be no change in the level of corporate misconduct.121   
According to one large-scale survey, since 2000, between 41% and 55% of employees 
indicate that they have observed misconduct within their organizations within the last twelve 
                                                             
119 McGreal, supra note 112, at 128. 
120 DELOITTE & COMPLIANCE WEEK, IN FOCUS: 2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY 8 (2015), available 
online at: http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-aers-reg-crs-2015-
compliance-trends-survey.pdf. This survey received 364 responses from compliance professionals. Id. at 3.  
121 See Baer, supra note 10, at 950 (arguing that “employee malfeasance—including the very types of 
wrongdoing that created the corporate crises in Enron and Worldcom—is on the rise.”) 
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months, and between 8% and 14% have felt pressure from within the organization to compromise 
the company’s standards.122 This misconduct is not just the actions of a few rogue employees 
scattered throughout the various corporations. In 53% of the cases of observed misconduct, the 
respondent indicated that the misconduct was committed by multiple people or was a company-
wide problem.123 In addition, the respondents are not just seeing one-off instances of poor conduct. 
In 26% of the cases, the misconduct was identified as an “ongoing pattern,” and in an additional 
41% of cases the misconduct was identified as happening over multiple incidents.124 Despite this 
widespread misconduct, over the past 13 years of this survey, between 37% and 47% of employees 
do not report the misconduct that they have observed.125  
Clearly, the above survey results should be considered more anecdotal than definitive. 
However, a closer look at the current state of compliance suggests that compliance programs at 
many organizations are at-risk of being “paper programs” (either intentionally or unintentionally). 
Among the concerns, some claim that corporations are not providing the compliance department 
                                                             
122 ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF THE U.S. WORKFORCE 14 (2014), 
available online at http://www.ethics.org/downloads/2013NBESFinalWeb.pdf. Although the percentage of 
employees observing misconduct typically increases as the economy improves, between the surveys of 
2011 and 2013, the economy improved but the level of observed misconduct declined. Id. at 15. The survey 
asked employees about 26 specific categories of misconduct, such as discrimination, violations of health or 
safety standards, stealing, falsifying expense reports, and breaching customer privacy. Id. at 41-42. 
123 Id. at 21. 41% of respondents indicated that the behavior was committed by multiple people, and 12% 
indicated that it was company-wide. Id. Other surveys find similar results. Tenbrunsel and Thomas 
conducted a survey with over 1200 respondents from the US and UK financial service/banking industry. 
ANN TENBRUNSEL & JORDON THOMAS, THE STREET, THE BULL AND THE CRISIS: A SURVEY OF THE US 
& UK FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 10 (2015). Among their results, they found that 47% of respondents 
believe that their competitors use unethical or illegal competitive tactics and that 34 percent of respondents 
earning over $500,000 annually have witnessed wrongdoing. Id. at  & 5. 
124 Ethics Resource Center, supra note 122, at 20-21. In addition, 43% of the misconduct was committed 
by senior leaders (24%) or middle managers (19%). Id. at 20. 
125 Id at 26. Of those that do report misconduct, since 2001, over 20% report experiencing some type of 
retaliation for reporting the misconduct. Id. For those that do report misconduct, 82% reported it to their 
supervisor. Id. at 30. Only 16% used a hotline and only 15% reported to an ethics officer. Id. 
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with sufficient resources.126 To make up for the lack of resources, the CECO must leverage the 
resources of other departments, which may only be successful if the CECO has sufficient clout 
within the organization.127  
Another concern is that the compliance department is not sufficiently involved in shaping 
a corporation’s culture. The compliance department most commonly has responsibility for 
compliance training, oversight of the organization’s code of conduct, the whistleblower hotline, 
and compliance investigations.128 Few compliance departments, however, have responsibility for 
assessing the organization’s culture.129  And, if no one in the organization has responsibility for 
this assessment, then it does not get done, and at best gets replaced by general reports.130 
 A recent academic study shows the challenges faced by CECOs to implement compliance 
programs.131 A significant problem is that many executives, managers, and employees believe that 
they are ethical people, and therefore do not need the assistance of the compliance department in 
being ethical.132 If executives and managers hold these beliefs, then that message trickles down 
through the whole organization and the CECOs have a significant challenge getting buy-in from 
any employee.133 Executives and managers can also hinder the program’s effectiveness by making 
exceptions to the compliance and ethics program’s policies.134 By making exceptions, rather than 
                                                             
126 DELOITTE & COMPLIANCE WEEK, supra note 120, at 5. 
127 Id. at 5. 
128 Id. at 10. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Linda Klebe Trevino et al., Legitimating the Legitimate: A Grounded Theory Study of Legitimacy Work 
Among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 123 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 186 (2014). 
132 Id. at 191 and 194. 
133 Id. at 194. 
134 Id. 
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applying policies consistently, the program loses its legitimacy and any hope at effectiveness.135 
Overall, as observed by CECOs, there is resistance to the need for their role, which severely limits 
their ability to act effectively.136 
 Thus, despite a CECO’s best efforts to try to meaningfully implement a compliance 
program by promoting an ethical corporate culture, those changes will not occur without the 
support and commitment of the corporation’s executives and board of directors. Although some 
executives and board members will give that support due to their commitment to ethical 
behavior,137 to make systematic change across corporate America corporate management needs 
greater guidance than currently given by the OSG.  
 Currently, managers’ understanding of how corporations can choose to implement their 
compliance programs is shaped heavily by Lynn Sharp Paine’s groundbreaking work that 
categorized compliance programs as either focused on deterrence or on motivating employees to 
do the right thing because it is the right thing to do. 138 In her article, after noting the importance 
of compliance programs and the need to educate managers and employees on their legal 
                                                             
135 Id. See also infra notes 225 to 248 and accompanying text (discussing how a compliance and ethics 
program loses legitimacy and the harms that causes to the program).  
136 Consistent with the Trevino et al. study just discussed in the text, one CECO outlined why there is 
resistance to the CECO position despite the growth in importance of compliance programs. Patrick J. 
Gnazzo, The Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer: A Test of Endurance, 116 BUS. & SOCIETY REV. 533 
(2011). First, management believes that everyone wants to do the right thing. Id. at 542. Second, executives 
and the board of directors do not understand the CECO’s role and what functions the CECO should be 
managing. Id. at 544. Third, is a belief that everyone in the organization should have the responsibility to 
do the right thing, which can develop into the belief that management is not responsible for the actions of 
others (as they have their own responsibility to do what is right). Id. at 545. Fourth, management believes 
that the CECO’s role will run counter to the organization’s goals of efficiency and effectiveness. Id. at 547. 
137 Trevino et al., supra note 132, at 195-96. 
138. Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 
110–11. 
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requirements,139 Paine argued that many compliance programs placed too much emphasis on 
“threat of detection and punishment.”140 She argued that programs focused only on penalties for 
noncompliance, and have “unrealistic” standards that ignore the “root causes of misconduct” in 
the organization, will be viewed as “nothing more than liability insurance for senior 
management.”141 An integrity strategy (as opposed to simply a “compliance” strategy), on the other 
hand, seeks “to create an environment that supports ethically sound behavior, and to instill a sense 
of shared accountability among employees.”142 Rather than viewing legal requirements as a 
“constraint imposed by external authorities,” managers must work to make ethical behavior and 
legal compliance a “positive aspect of organizational life.”143 According to Paine, an integrity 
strategy has the same basic structural features as a compliance strategy (e.g., codes of conduct, 
training, mechanisms to investigate potential wrongdoing, hotlines, audits, and internal controls), 
but it goes deeper into the organization’s operating patterns and requires the involvement of all 
managers.144 Ultimately, she argued, it must be a management driven process, not a lawyer driven 
process.145 In short, a compliance program based on an integrity strategy focuses on a 
“commitment to ethical values,” as opposed to the more basic goal of “prevent criminal 
misconduct.”146 The OSG Advisory Committee Report noted the influence of Paine’s article, and 
                                                             
139 Id. at 109 (noting that “employees can be frustrated and frightened by the complexity of today’s legal 
environment” and “even managers who claim to use the law as a guide to ethical behavior often lack more 
than a rudimentary understanding” of the law). 
140 Id. at 110. 
141 Id. at 111. 
142 Id. at 111. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 113. 
146 Id. at 113 & 117. Paine further states that “In the end, creating a climate that encourages exemplary 
conduct may be the best way to discourage damaging misconduct. Only in such an environment do rogues 
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favorably cited it as a reason for requiring corporations to promote an ethical corporate culture in 
the 2004 amendments.147 
 Over time, however, the discussion of Paine’s compliance versus integrity approaches to 
compliance programs has evolved to the point where her ideas have been taken to an extreme. 
Paine’s criticisms of relying heavily on monitoring and sanctioning have been taken by some to 
mean that integrity-based compliance program should attempt to minimize the use of formal 
monitoring of employees’ behavior.148 Based on academic research findings, a concern developed 
that too much monitoring would cause employees to feel untrustworthy (and thus start to act 
untrustworthy), or that acting for extrinsic reasons would “crowd out” intrinsic reasons for 
following the company’s standards.149 In either case, the program could become counter-
productive. Other commentators believed that an integrity-based program’s focus on a 
corporation’s ethical culture was an attempt to judge whether the corporation adopted appropriate 
ethical values and was not directly related to preventing criminal conduct.150 
The result of these concerns, as well as a general lack of understanding of corporate culture, 
is that the technical side of compliance programs often runs parallel to culture issues, rather than 
                                                             
really act alone.” Id. at 117. This concept of using the compliance program to encourage employees to “do 
the right” thing, as opposed to a program that focuses only on preventing misconduct is illustrated through 
a quote by former SEC Chair, Richard Breeden, “It is not adequate ethical standard to aspire to get through 
the day without being indicted.” Id. at 111. 
147 Advisory Group Report, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 51. 
148 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with 
Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 105 (2002) (noting that employees may only accept a “threshold” 
level of monitoring and that “ethics-or integrity-based systems will often deliberately be designed in such 
a way that they look particularly leaky.”); Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance 
Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 818-19 (2014) (stating that a corporation choosing to utilize an integrity-
based system over a command-and-control system may elect to replace employee monitoring with an honor 
code system). 
149 See infra notes 184 to 189 and accompanying text (discussing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation). 
150 O’Sullivan, supra note 96, at 509-10. 
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treating compliance and culture as two sides of the same coin. In addition, there is the tendency to 
see compliance and ethics programs as either effective or ineffective based on a one-time analysis. 
An alternative view sees compliance and ethics programs as dynamic; an evolving journey with 
progress and setbacks.151 Thus, instead of asking if the corporation is “done” implementing a 
compliance program, the appropriate question is “where is the culture of the organization headed?” 
 The 2004 and 2010 amendments to the OSG are important steps in encouraging the 
development of truly effective compliance programs and integrating compliance and culture. 
However, those amendments do not provide sufficient guidance to corporations—especially the 
executives and members of the boards of directors of those corporations—to understand what their 
compliance department should be doing and how other departments in the corporation can support 
those efforts. The next Part presents a model that shows how the compliance program and the 
organization’s corporate culture are related, and can either support or work against each other. 
Recent behavioral ethics research provides support for this model and additional insights.152 If 
incorporated into the OSG, this model will assist in granting legitimacy to the work of the CECO 
and provide guidance to executives and board members on where to focus their attention (and what 
to evaluate) to determine if their corporation has an effective compliance and ethics program. The 
framework presented here provides guidance to these individuals to understand the linkage 
between culture and compliance, but does not unnecessarily dictate an approach that would 
encourage a check-the-box approach to compliance. In short, it helps reframe compliance as a 
                                                             
151 See Baer, supra note 10, at 956 (noting that under a “new governance” approach to compliance, 
“regulators and regulated entities would treat compliance problems . . . as a symptom of a continuing 
problem to be addressed over time, rather than as a cultural failure that could be “cured” by some 
combination of prosecutorial threat and internal ethics remediation.”) 
152 See infra Part III.B. 
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managerial issue, not solely a legal issue,153 and does so in a way that places the focus on 
behavioral ethics, not judging the ethical values of a company. 
 
III. A Corporation’s Ethical Infrastructure 
 
A.  Overview of the Ethical Infrastructure Model 
Tenbrunsel and colleagues developed the concept of an organization’s ethical 
infrastructure.154 This model is relatively straightforward, which makes it easy to see the 
relationships between the three systems in the model. In addition, it moves us away from the 
either/or approach of compliance-based versus integrity-based programs, and provides a 
comprehensive view of organizational factors that influence ethical behavior.  
An organization’s ethical infrastructure consists of three systems: a formal system, which 
is embedded within an informal system, which is embedded within the organization’s climate.155 
The formal and the informal systems both consist of communication, surveillance, and sanctioning 
systems, as briefly described below:156  
 Formal System: 
                                                             
153 Paine, supra note 138, at 113. 
154 Ann E. Tenbrunsel et al., Building Houses on Rocks: The Role of the Ethical Infrastructure in 
Organizations, 16 SOC. JUST. RESEARCH 285 (2003). 
155 Id. at 286-87. 
156 Id. at 286. 
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o Communication: This includes the explicit guidelines for how employees 
should perform their jobs in an ethical manner, including codes of conduct, 
training programs, and written performance standards.157  
o Surveillance: This is the organization’s official policies and procedures on 
how it will monitor employees and how employees can report 
wrongdoing.158 
o Sanctioning: This includes the formal rewards and punishments of the 
organization, including performance evaluations and promotions, as well as 
the sanctions for wrongdoing.159 
 
 Informal System: 
o Communication: This is the “water cooler” conversations and other 
informal interactions that convey the organization’s ethical norms.160 
Informal communications also includes the “tone at the top,” as set by 
leadership’s actual behavior (not leadership’s official policies). 
o Surveillance: This is the observation of an employee’s behavior by his or 
her peers or supervisors, with any violations of ethical norms handled 
outside of, or in addition to, the organization’s official policies and 
procedures.161 
                                                             
157 Id. at 287 & 289. 
158 Id. at 287 & 290-91. 
159 Id. at 287 & 290-91. 
160 Id. at 291. 
161 Id. at 292. 
 
 
38 
 
o Sanctioning: Examples of informal sanctions include ostracism, negative 
social interactions, and group pressure.162 
The third system of the ethical infrastructure is the organizational climate. An 
organization’s climate is the employees’ shared perceptions of the organization as it relates to any 
particular aspect of the organization.163 As opposed the formal and informal systems that are based 
on tangible events (e.g., company policies, actual treatment by other employees), the climate is 
based on how employees perceive the totality of all those various actions and events.164 
For the ethical infrastructure model, Tenbrunsel and colleagues consider the organizational 
climate towards three issues: ethics, respect, and procedural justice.165 With respect to ethics, the 
organizational climate determines what type of behavior is expected of employees and supported 
by the organization.166  Although those in the compliance field more commonly refer to an 
organization’s culture, the management literature distinguishes between an ethical climate and an 
ethical culture. The organization’s ethical climate relates to employees’ perceptions of what is or 
is not unethical behavior in that organization.167 That is, what is or is not the “right” way to act in 
that organization.168 Ethical culture, on the other hand, relates to those factors in the organization 
that “impede unethical behavior and encourage ethical behavior.”169 As operationalized in 
                                                             
162 Id. at 292. 
163 Id. at 294. 
164 Id. at 296. 
165 Id. at 294. 
166 Id. at 294. 
167 Muel Kaptein, Understanding Unethical Behavior by Unraveling Ethical Culture, 64 HUMAN 
RELATIONS 843, 845 (2011). 
168 Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bad Barrels: Meta-Analytic Evidence About 
Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 1, 6 (2010). 
169 Kaptein, supra note 167, at 845. 
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research, researchers have found a strong correlation between these two constructs.170 Overall, 
ethical climate relates to the organization’s expected behavior with respect to ethical issues, and 
the ethical culture relates to behavioral control.171 
 The climate for respect refers to the extent to which employs are “shown consideration, 
and treated with dignity.”172 The climate for procedural justice is the employees’ perceptions “of 
the fairness of the procedures used to make decisions” in the organization.173 Respect and 
procedural justice are important because fair treatment by the organization encourages employees 
to reciprocate in their behavior towards the organization and its rules.174 In addition, respectful 
treatment from the organization encourages thoughtful consideration of the welfare of others, as 
opposed to focusing only on self-interest.175 
Understanding that the formal system is embedded in the informal system, which is all 
embedded in the organizational climate, is important for understanding how the ethical 
infrastructure actually impacts employees’ ethical behavior.176 With respect to influencing 
behavior, the more deeply embedded system is the more influential system. Thus, the formal 
                                                             
170 Sean R. Martin et al., Blind Forces: Ethical Infrastructures and Moral Disengagement in Organizations, 
4 ORG. PSYCH. REV. 295, 300 (2014). 
171 Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 168, at 7. 
172 Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 154, at 294. 
173 Id. at 294. 
174 Id. at 295. The authors acknowledge the strong “conceptual overlap” between the climates for respect 
and procedural justice, but keep them as separate concepts in their model because “respect for the individual 
is a construct that has been overlooked in the organizational ethics literature and, thus, deserves its own 
special treatment.” Id. at 296. 
175 Id. at 295. 
176 “The authors modeled ethical infrastructure as three concentric circles—starting with the innermost 
circle of formal systems, followed by informal systems, and then encompassed by the outermost circle, 
organizational climates—that simultaneously support and influence each other.” Martin et al., supra note 
170, at 300. 
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system is weaker than the informal system, which is weaker than the organizational climate.177 
The informal system is stronger than the formal system because the informal system better reflects 
the reality of what the employee is facing.178 For example, a formal code of conduct or the lessons 
from a training session can be easily trumped by a conflicting message from the employee’s 
informal environment (e.g., group pressures). The organizational climate is stronger than the 
informal system because it is the employees’ perceptions of what type of behavior is appropriate 
and expected in that environment. Because the systems are embedded, the overall strength of the 
ethical infrastructure depends on how consistent the three systems are with each other.179 Thus, a 
strong formal program that is inconsistent with the informal system and organizational climate will 
not be an effective compliance program.180 
 
                                                             
177 Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 154, at 299-300. The authors state:  
More specifically, we argue that formal systems are weaker than informal systems because 
the principles that are conveyed through formal systems are less entrenched in an 
employee’s organizational experience and hence the furthest removed from that individual; 
similarly, informal systems are weaker than organizational climate because the principles 
conveyed through informal systems are less rooted in the organizational experience and 
hence further removed from the individual than those conveyed through the relevant 
climates. 
 Id. at 300. 
178 Id. at 300. 
179 Id. at 302. 
180 Id. at 303 (stating, “If they are to be effective, formal ethical systems must reside in informal 
reinforcements and organizational climates that are solid. If not, the formal systems acts more like a Band-
Aid than an antibiotic, addressing the symptoms, but not the underlying causes.”) 
 
 
41 
 
B. An Evidence-Based Approach to Compliance Programs: The Empirical 
Evidence in Support of the Ethical Infrastructure Model 
In addition to helping us better understand the link between compliance and culture, the 
ethical infrastructure model helps us understand recent behavioral ethics research that relates to 
the problems identified above from the extreme interpretations of Paine’s compliance versus 
integrity approaches.181 For example, this model helps us understand the research showing when 
sanctions work to increase intrinsic moral motivation and support Paine’s integrity approach. The 
model also shows the research behind which values in an organization’s climate matter for 
implementing an effective compliance and ethics program. As discussed below, employee 
perceptions of fairness in the organization is not judging the organization as a “good” or “bad” 
organization, but is empirically shown to be an important factor in determining the likelihood that 
employees follow the law and the company’s rules. Therefore, the climate for procedural justice 
must be understood and managed as part of an effective compliance and ethics program. The 
following subsections highlight these and other research findings. 
1. When Sanctions Work 
Viewing compliance programs as the formal system within the organization’s ethical 
infrastructure helps us understand when a company’s formal surveillance and sanction practices 
help promote ethical behavior. As discussed above, Paine’s distinction between a compliance-
based program and an integrity-based program has created confusion on the use of sanctions—
                                                             
181 See supra notes 148 to 150 and accompanying text. 
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suggesting that they may crowd out intrinsic motivations.182 Recent research suggests that the 
relationship between extrinsic motivation and ethical behavior is more complicated.183  
One of the most well known studies on crowding out demonstrates how the over-
simplification of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation can provide misleading advice. In a study on 
day cares, researchers found that the imposition of a fine for parents that picked their children up 
late actually increased the number of late pick-ups rather than reduced the number, as was the 
intention of the day care’s managers in imposing the fine.184 The reason, according to the authors, 
was that the imposition of the fine (an extrinsic motivation) caused parents to view being late as 
price to be paid instead of viewing a late pick-up as the breaking of a promise to show up on time 
(an intrinsic motivation).185 For compliance programs, managers interpreted these findings as 
implying that the use of extrinsic motivation tactics will crowd out employees’ intrinsic motivation 
to follow the rules.186 Thus, to use a sanctioning system, the organization will need to devote even 
more resources to monitoring employee behavior to make up for the decreased internal motivation 
to follow the rules.187 
                                                             
182 See supra 148 to 150 and accompanying text. 
183 See infra notes 184 to 200 and accompanying text (reviewing recent research on extrinsic 
motivation). 
184 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-8 (2000). 
185 Id. at 13-15. 
186 See Gerald E. Ledford, Jr., et al, Negative Effects of Extrinsic Motivation on Intrinsic Motivation: More 
Smoke than Fire, 22 WORLDATWORK JOURNAL 17, 17 (2013), stating: 
A recurring theme in the popular management literature is that extrinsic rewards diminish 
intrinsic motivation, and this problem is so serious that it can render extrinsic incentives 
for performance of any kind as ineffective or even counterproductive. 
187  Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value 
of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1287, 1295 (2005).  
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A deeper analysis, however, shows that the relationship is more complex and there are 
fundamental questions of when extrinsic motivations crowd out intrinsic motivations and when 
they are “mutually reinforcing.”188 A wide variety of factors influence the result, such as a person’s 
starting level of interest of in the activity (i.e., level of intrinsic motivation) and if the extrinsic 
motivation is a reward or a punishment.189 Thus, generalizing from studies such as the day care 
study is not necessarily useful. Instead, we should interpret those results along with studies 
involving ethical issues in an organization setting. This is where the ethical infrastructure model 
is useful. 
In a study on business ethics, Professor Mulder argues that in certain situations sanctions 
can increase individuals’ moral concerns related to that issue, as opposed to “crowding out” those 
concerns.190 Under her model, a sanctioning system will increase “moral concerns” (intrinsic 
motivation) if the employee perceives the sanction as retribution, as opposed to compensation for 
the damaged caused.191 Mulder identifies various factors that influence when an employee is more 
likely to view a sanction as retribution rather than simply compensation. First, a severe (as opposed 
to a mild) sanction “will more easily trigger retributive concerns” because it is more likely to 
communicate that the authority figure views the behavior as morally wrong.192 Second, a non-
                                                             
188 Yuval Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: 
Theoretical and Empirical Insights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 12 J. L. & POLICY 11, 14 (2011). 
An additional fundamental question is determining which motivations fall under extrinsic motivation and 
which motivations fall under intrinsic motivation. Id at 18-19.  
189 Id. at 26. 
190 Laetitia B. Mulder, The Two-Fold Influence of Sanctions on Moral Concerns, in PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING 169, 170 (David DeCremer, ed., 2009). 
191 Id. at 171-72. 
192 Id. at 172-73. The sanction must still be fair, as too severe of a penalty may be viewed as unfair and 
illegitimate, and the employee may not accept the retributive message. Id. at 176. 
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financial penalty (a loss of privileges, for example) is more likely to be viewed as retributive.193 
Third, if the sanctioned behavior is relatively rare in the local group, then it is more likely to be 
retribution.194 Thus, if it is common for members in the group to engage in the behavior and receive 
a small financial penalty as a result, then the employee is likely to view the penalty as 
compensatory and moral concerns will not be engaged. Finally, if the authority makes the immoral 
aspects of the behavior salient to the employee (and how the action is disapproved by others for 
those reasons), then the employee will view the sanction as retribution.195 
Importantly, that sanctioning system operates within the organization’s ethical 
infrastructure. To receive the retributive message based on the above factors, the employee must 
accept the moral authority of the person giving the sanction.196 Influenced by the work of Professor 
Tom Tyler, Mulder argues that an employee will accept the moral message of the sanction if the 
employee trusts the authority and the sanction is administered through a procedurally fair 
system.197 Trust and procedural justice increase the legitimacy of the retributive sanction and raises 
                                                             
193 Id. at 173. 
194 Id. at 174. 
195 Id. at 174-75. 
196 Id. at 175.  
197 Id. at 175. See also, Laetitia B. Mulder et al., Sanctions and Moral Judgments: The Moderating Effect 
of Sanction Severity and Trust in Authorities, 39 EURO. J. SOC. PSYCH. 255, 265 (2009) (presenting the 
results of three empirical studies showing the importance of trust in the sanctioning authority, as lack of 
trust may cause the person sanction to question the motivation of the authority (e.g., imposing a sanction 
due to self-interest) or question the ability of the authority to judge the morality of the action).  
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moral concerns.198 Subsequent research confirms these conclusions.199 Thus, only in the presence 
of a climate for procedural justice will appropriately structured formal sanctions increase moral 
concerns. In addition to formal sanctions, the effectiveness of informal sanctions to cause an 
individual to update their moral judgment from their transgression will also depend on the 
organization’s climate.200 As shown by these studies and discussed further in the next subsection, 
the organization’s climate for procedural justice (in which both the formal and informal systems 
are embedded) is important for understanding the effectiveness of a compliance program. 
2. The Organizational Climate 
 The ethical infrastructure model considers the organizational climate towards three issues: 
ethics, respect, and procedural justice.201 With respect to the ethical climate, researchers have 
identified five different types of ethical climates.202 When faced with an ethical dilemma, the 
climate of the organization tells an employee what is appropriate to consider as follows: 
                                                             
198 Mulder, supra note , at 176. Mulder summarizes the implications of her findings as: 
[M]erely installing a sanctioning system may often not be enough: It may be necessary to make 
clear to individuals why the sanctioned behavior is immoral (for example, because it harms others 
or the collective) and, preferably, the feeling should be created that most other people do not show 
the behavior and disapprove of it. Also, it should be made clear that the sanction is not a payment 
that softens the consequences of one’s behavior. . . . [T]he sanction should be severe enough that 
so that is shows disapproval, but not so severe that it is perceived as unreasonable and illegitimate. 
Id. at 176-77. 
199 See Peter Verboon & Marius van Dijke, When Do Severe Sanctions Enhance Compliance? The Role of 
Procedural Fairness, 32 J. ECON. PSYCH. 120, 127 (2011) (stating “Severe sanctions increased compliance 
with the authority more than mild sanctions, but this effect was found only when authorities acted in a fair 
manner. . . . [T]his effect results because followers morally evaluate the enacting authority higher.”) 
200  Danielle E. Warren & Kristin Smith-Crowe, Deciding what’s right: The role of external sanctions and 
embarrassment in shaping moral judgments in the workplace, 28 RESEARCH ORG. BEHAVIOR 81, 97-99 
(2008) (discussing the need for the sanctioned individual to identify with the source of the sanction in order 
to update his or her moral judgment of the action that provoked the informal sanction).  
201 Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 154, at 297. 
202 Linda Klebe Trevino et al., (Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANNUAL REV. PSYCH. 635, 640 
(2014). 
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 Instrumental climate: Employees will only consider their own self-interest or the 
interest of the organization. 
 Caring climate: Employees will consider the needs of others. 
 Independence climate: Employees believe they should use their own values as a 
guide. 
 Rules climate: The rules of the organization determine how to handle any dilemma 
faced by an employee. 
 Laws and Codes Climate: Society’s standards dictate the appropriate behavior for 
employees. 
Research has supported the influence of ethical climates on ethical behavior. In 2010, Kish-
Gephart and colleagues conducted what is called a meta-analysis of thirty years of research on 
unethical behavior in organizations.203 The results showed that a self-interested climate increased 
unethical behavior, while caring, rules, and laws and codes climates reduced unethical behavior.204  
The work of Tom Tyler shows the importance of an organization’s climate for procedural 
justice (or, procedural fairness) and how it influences the organization’s formal and informal 
systems. With respect to employee compliance in organizational settings, research has shown that 
                                                             
203 Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 168, at 1. The authors’ research included 136 different studies. Id. at 10. 
In addition to examining the organizational environment, the authors also examined individual differences 
(including demographics (e.g., age and gender) and psychological differences (e.g., philosophical 
orientation, locus of control)) and the characteristics of the moral issue at hand (e.g., proximity to the harm, 
magnitude of consequences). Id at 2-5. 
204 Id. at 21. The authors referred to self-interested climates as egoistic, a caring climate as benevolent, and 
the rules and law climates as principled. Id. at 6. The authors excluded the independence climate as it 
focused on individuals following their own beliefs. Id. See also Aditya Simha & John B. Cullen, Ethical 
Climates and Their Effects on Organizational Outcomes: Implications From the Past and Prophecies for 
the Future, 26 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 20, 27 (2012) (stating that “The essential theme emerging 
from this stream of research is that benevolent and principled climates (i.e., caring, independence, rules, 
and law and code) are the climates associated with positive outcomes, and egoistic climates (i.e., 
instrumental) are associated with a whole host of negative outcomes.”) 
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procedural justice is more important that outcome fairness.205 The climate for procedural justice 
in an organization involves two aspects. First, that the decision-making process is fair (e.g., the 
employees have some voice in the process, rules and policies are followed consistently for all 
organization members, and decisions are made transparently).206 Second, that there is fairness in 
interpersonal treatment. 207 This aspect is similar to the climate of respect under the ethical 
infrastructure model.208 
Tyler’s research shows that when the organization operates in a procedurally fair manner, 
then employees will believe in the legitimacy of management’s authority and believe that their 
values match the values of the organization.209 This, in turn, causes voluntary compliance with the 
organization’s rules, and is significantly more effective in eliciting rule compliance than an 
approach based on risk of punishment.210  
                                                             
205 Tom Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment to Compliance: Building Value-Based Cultures, 50 CAL. 
MGMT. REV. 31, 33 (2008). 
206 Id. Legitimacy is the “belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, 
and just” and “when it is possessed, leads people to defer voluntarily to decisions, rules, and social 
arrangement.” Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANNUAL 
REV. PSYCH. 375, 376 (2006). Tyler states that the research on organizations shows that “those authorities 
who exercise their authority fairly are more likely to be viewed as legitimate.” Id. at 380. See also Id. at 
392 (stating “The findings reviewed consistently suggest that the legitimacy of authorities and institutions 
is linked to the fairness of the procedures by which they exercise their authority”) and 394 (stating 
“legitimacy derives from judgments about how those others exercise authority, judgments not based upon 
the favorability or even the fairness of the decisions the authorities make, but upon beliefs about what are 
fair or ethical procedures for exercising authority.”) 
207 Tyler et al, supra note 205, at 33 & 37 (describing this factor as “the manner in which people are treated 
while decisions are being made include whether processes are dignified and the people in them are treated 
politely, whether people’s rights are respected, and whether the authorities involved are sincerely trying to 
do what is right for all of the people in the situation’”) 
208 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
209 Tyler et al, supra note 205, at 34 & 36. 
210 Id. at 34-35. These findings are consistent with Tyler’s work on why people follow the law more 
generally. See Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Criminal Justice, 7 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 315 (2009) (stating “people are more likely to obey the law if they think it is legitimate 
and/or consistent with their values”). 
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Additional research confirms the importance of the organization’s climates for procedural 
justice and respect for encouraging ethical behavior.211  For example, Trevino and Weaver found 
that employees observed less unethical conduct in their organizations and were more likely to 
report observed wrongdoing if they had a general perception that their organization treated 
employees fairly. 212 Consistent with Tyler, fair treatment included employees’ perceptions that 
the organization consistently follows through on its ethics program (e.g., following up on reports 
of unethical behavior and disciplining those that violate the company’s policies).213 Overall, recent 
research in behavioral ethics shows the direct importance of the climates for ethics, procedural 
justice, and respect, in influencing employee behavior. 
 
3. The Importance of Local Managers 
Much of the discussion about compliance programs has focused on the “tone at the top.”214 
That is, the ethical tone for the organization set by company executives. The academic literature, 
however, shows that the tone set by local managers is equally important. Employees’ interactions 
                                                             
211 A review of the behavioral ethics literature published in 2006 stated that “individual’s expectations for 
fairness . . . produce expectations in observers that those who violate ethical expectations will be disciplined 
. . . . Failure to satisfy the “fairness heuristic” . . . is likely  to lead to self-protection and possibly unethical 
behavior” (citations omitted). Linda K. Trevino et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. 
OF MGMT. 951, 966 (2006). 
212 Linda Klebe Trevino & Gary R. Weaver, Organizational Justice and Ethics Program “Follow-
Through”: Influences on Employees’ Harmful and Helpful Behavior, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q. 651, 663-65 
(2001). 
213 Id. The authors believe these results show that “ethics/compliance management should be more tightly 
coupled with the management of the broader organizational culture to improve employees’ perceptions of 
fairness in the organization in general and in the ethics/compliance program.” Id. at 667. 
214 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 785, 814 (2013); Gregory V. Page 
et al., The "Tone at the Top": Can It Mitigate C-Suite Personal Liability?,  63 FOOD DRUG L.J. 723, 731 
(2008). 
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with local managers heavily influence the climate of the organization (in which both of the other 
systems are embedded) and the informal system. 
The work by Tyler and colleagues discussed above on an organization’s climates for 
procedural justice and respect show that the employee’s perception is determined by treatment at 
the workgroup level as well as from the tone at the top.215 The formal rules of the organizations on 
how decisions are to be made and how employees are to be treated also influence the climate. 216  
However, how the managers interacting with employees actually make their decisions and 
personally treat the employees are equally important.217 
In addition to influencing perceptions of justice, research shows that interactions in the 
informal system with local managers influence ethical decision-making. For example, Kaptein 
explored a variety of factors that could influence the effectiveness of a company’s code of 
conduct.218 The strongest influence on reducing unethical behavior was how well both senior 
management and local management lived up to the code of conduct.219 Kaptein measured 
managements’ influence by asking employees if their managers were viewed as “positive role 
models as regards the [code of ethics], set reasonable performance targets . . . that promote 
compliance with the [code], do not authorize violations of the [code] to meet business goals, are 
approachable if employees have questions about or report violates of the [code], are aware of the 
                                                             
215 Tyler et al, supra note 205, at 35.  
216 Steven L Bader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning 
of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULLETIN 747, 749  & 755-56 (2003). 
217 Id. 
218 Muel Kaptein, Toward Effective Codes: Testing the Relationship with Unethical Behavior, 99 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 233, 234-38 (2011).  
219 Id. at 245. 
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extent to which employees violate and comply with the [code], and respond appropriately when 
they become aware of any violations of the [code].”220 
Other research confirms Kaptein’s findings on the importance of these interpersonal 
interactions at the local level. For example, people are more likely to behave ethically when they 
have the opportunity to discuss the ethical aspects of the questionable behavior, as opposed to 
being surrounded by discussions only related to self-interest.221 Employees are more likely to 
internally report instances of observed wrongdoing if they are surrounded by ethical co-workers 
in addition to ethical leadership.222 Overall, the ethical infrastructure model shows the need to 
monitor and manage these interpersonal interactions at the local level in the informal system to 
have an effective compliance and ethics program. These interactions both influence the climate of 
the organization and directly impact ethical behavior. 
 
4. Lost Legitimacy: Understanding the Double-Edged Sword of 
“Mandated” Compliance Programs 
Corporations adopt or modify their compliance programs due to government pressure. Due 
to the incentives of the OSG and the consideration of compliance programs under the DOJ’s 
prosecution manual,223 compliance programs are essentially “mandated” by the government. The 
                                                             
220 Id. at 241. 
221 Trevino et al. 2014, supra note 243, at 643. 
222 David M. Mayer et al., Encouraging Employees to Report Unethical Conduct Internally: It Takes a 
Village, 121 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 89, 100 (2013) 
223 See supra notes 61 to 68 and accompanying text. 
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ethical infrastructure model shows how these “mandated” programs can lead not just to ineffective 
programs (and a waste of resources), but also be counter-productive programs.224  
Tenbrunsel and colleagues argued that the relationship between the ethical infrastructure 
of the organization and ethical behavior is not linear, but curvilinear.225 That is, consider a graph 
where the Y-axis (vertical axis) is unethical behavior and the X-axis (horizontal axis) starts at no 
ethical infrastructure and moves to a weak infrastructure and then to a stronger infrastructure. As 
we move from no infrastructure to a weak infrastructure, the amount of unethical behavior will 
increase. As the infrastructure gets stronger, then the amount of unethical behavior will decrease. 
This inverted U-shape results because a weak ethical infrastructure is expected to lead to more 
unethical behavior than an organization having no infrastructure. The reason for this, according to 
the authors, is because the organization’s infrastructure encourages individuals to “no longer rely 
on their values; rather they look to the organization to decide what is ethical.”226 If there is an 
ethical infrastructure but it is weak, then the individuals receive the message that “the ethical 
principles or values in question are relatively unimportant.”227  
                                                             
224 Laufer also argues that compliance programs can be counter-productive. See supra notes 80 to 86 and 
accompanying text. However, his argument is based on a moral hazard argument. Id. The argument here is 
based on lost legitimacy of the program, which can occur even with managers that have no intention to 
undermine the compliance program. See infra notes 246 to 248 and accompanying text. 
225 Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 154, at 297. 
226 Id. at 297. The authors further explain: “When there is no infrastructure in place, individuals are more 
likely to perceive the ethical dimensions of the decision and hence are more likely to behave ethically. 
When a strong ethical infrastructure is in place, individuals behave ethically because the organization is 
telling them that they have to do so. However, when a weak infrastructure is in place, individuals do not 
perceive the ethical dimensions of the situation nor do they sense any deep ethical conviction from the 
organization. Consequently, ethical behavior is least likely when an ethical infrastructure is weak.” Id at 
299. 
227 Id. The authors also state, “Perhaps one of the worst things that can happen is for an organization to put 
in figureheads and systems that are only weakly supported. Perhaps even worse is to initiate an ethics 
program only to abandon it, or decrease its importance, at a later point in time because attention shifts 
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An organization that uses a “paper program” is an organization that has a weak ethical 
infrastructure. Under institutional theory in organization studies, a corporation’s adoption of a 
“paper program” is referred to as being “decoupled” from the organization. Decoupling occurs 
when an organization faces pressure to adopt certain practices to gain or to maintain legitimacy 
with external audiences, but those practices conflict with other goals of the organization.228 In 
response, the organization adopts the practices, but does not fully implement those practices.229 It 
is important to remember that this does not mean that the entire organization fails to implement 
the compliance program, but it may be that only certain departments within the organization fail 
to implement the practices.230  
An in-depth case study by MacLean and Behnam showed the dangers of decoupling.231 
Their research subject was a large mutual life insurance company that engaged in certain deceptive 
sales practices that were banned in every state.232 Although the company made strong statements 
against the practices and developed a compliance program to prevent the practices, the compliance 
program contained a loophole that allowed employees to easily work around the controls that 
prevented the practices.233 With respect to the formal communication, surveillance, and 
                                                             
elsewhere. Such weak, or weakened, efforts may send a signal that ethical considerations are actually 
unimportant, thus increasing, rather than decreasing unethical behavior.” Id. at 304. 
228 Tammy L. MacLean & Michael Behnam, The Dangers of Decoupling: The Relationship Between 
Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized Misconduct, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
1499, 1500 (2010). 
229 Id. at 1500-1501. 
230 See id. (stating “decoupled compliance structures may either manifest themselves as public of programs 
that do not exist in practice, or as programs that exist in practice but are disconnected from important, on-
going, line-related organizational functions”). 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 1502. 
233 Id. at 1507. In short, the compliance program used a 90-day window from the sale of a policy to monitor 
activity that would indicate use of this deceptive sales practice (“churning”). Id. Employees, however, 
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sanctioning systems, the sales personnel only received compliance training once a year (which was 
the minimum required under federal regulations),234 the monitoring of sales practices was very 
limited compared to the monitoring of sales results,235 and if the company did find wrongful sales 
practices, the typical punishment was a warning letter (and not the progressive disciplinary actions 
stated in formal policy).236 In the informal system, managers made fun of violations rather than 
punishing the behavior.237 Due to this lack of meaningful implementation, employees viewed the 
compliance program as a “self-protection mechanism for senior executives.”238 Those in the 
compliance department viewed their meetings as “empty rituals.”239 Those outside the compliance 
department viewed the compliance program as a “hassle” and “a system to beat.”240  
The program had lost legitimacy with the employees. The ineffective compliance program 
was not simply a waste of the company’s resources, but helped lead to the “institutionalization of 
organizational misconduct.”241  Looking at the situation through the lens of the ethical 
infrastructure model, the continued existence of a compliance program that was widely known to 
be ineffective had an impact on the informal system and the organization’s ethical climate. The 
                                                             
quickly learned that they could wait 91 days from a sale to engage in the wrongful practice and the system 
would not catch their activity. Id. 
234 Id. at 1507. 
235 Id. at 1509. In addition, it would not be uncommon for the audit or compliance department to be told to 
“slow down” an investigation into wrongful practices. Id. at 1509-10. 
236 Id. at 1509-10. 
237 Id. at 1509. 
238 Id. at 1510. 
239 Id. at 1511. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 1516. 
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widely ignored compliance program sent a message to employees on what was expected behavior 
and this message was reinforced through informal interactions among the organizational members. 
Larger scale empirical studies have reached similar conclusions. An important early study 
on compliance programs found that if employees developed a cynical perception of the company’s 
compliance program and believed that it served only to protect top management from blame for 
any wrongdoing, then the organization suffered from more unethical behavior and employees were 
less likely to report any observed wrongdoing.242 Recent reviews of the empirical business ethics 
literature found that after controlling for other factors related to an organization’s ethical climate 
and culture, the mere existence of an ethics code actually has a positive effect on unethical 
behavior.243 Although this may simply mean that those respondents to the surveys in the studies 
were more aware of what should be considered unethical behavior than respondents from 
companies without a code,244 it also suggests that without a supportive ethical culture “employees 
can view the mere existence of a code as a negative sign that the code represents window dressing 
only, thus producing a cynical response that leads to more unethical behavior.”245 In a more recent 
study, MacLean and colleagues conclude from their survey-based research that “When 
organizational members perceive ethics programs as merely window dressing they may also 
                                                             
242 Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works And What Hurts, 41 
Calif. Mgmt. Rev. 131, 136-40 (1999). The authors’ conclude that having a program that is perceived as 
protecting top management “may be worse than having no program at all.” Id. at 140. 
243 Linda Klebe Trevino et al., (Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANNUAL REV. PSYCH. 635, 639 
(2014); Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 168, at 21.  
244 In survey-based research, the researchers typically measure unethical behavior in an organization by 
whether or not the employee has observed unethical behavior in the last twelve months. Thus, a code of 
conduct helps an employee understand and identify unethical behavior, and therefore the employee may 
become more aware of unethical behavior happening in the organization. This employee is then more likely 
to report on the survey that he or she has observed wrongdoing than an employee that is less aware that 
certain conduct is occurring or that it violates company policy.  
245 Trevino et al., supra note 202, at 639. 
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perceive the organization as lacking integrity, demonstrating inconsistency between its words and 
deeds . . . thus leading to negative perceptions.”246 
Importantly, a compliance program’s loss of legitimacy is not necessarily due to an 
organization’s intentional, bad faith decision to adopt a “paper program.” Instead, hurdles and 
misunderstandings within the organization can prevent compliance programs from being 
implemented appropriately. For example, the research discussed above shows that despite the 
increased attention placed on compliance programs in the last few years, many CECOs still face 
challenges in gaining support from other members of the organization.247 Organizational members 
resist the CECO’s efforts for a variety of reasons, such as believing that ethics is something each 
individual has learned before entering the workforce (and that it is “very, very odd” to have 
someone from the business teaching ethics), without a crisis facing the organization the issues of 
ethics and compliance are a very low priority, senior managers typically view themselves as an 
expert in ethics, the program is viewed as a “check the box” activity, or the program is viewed as 
conflicting with other business goals.248 To the extent that the program is not appropriately 
implemented for any of these reasons, the legitimacy of the program is slowly chipped away, which 
can have negative consequences for the organization. 
 
                                                             
246 Tammy MacLean et al., When Organizations Don’t Walk Their Talk: A Cross-Level Examination of 
How Decoupling Formal Ethics Programs Affects Organizational Members, 128 J. BUS. ETHICS 351, 354 
(2015) (CITATIONS OMITTED FROM THE QUOTE). 
247 See supra notes 131 to 136 and accompanying text. 
248 Trevino et al., supra note 131, at 191-94. 
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IV. Policy Implications 
 
A. Amending the OSG 
The OSG must be reformed to ensure that compliance and ethics programs are focused on 
managerial issues, not simply legal issues.249 From a managerial perspective, the goal of a 
compliance and ethics program is not simply to prevent a bad person from doing a bad thing, but 
to ensure that the organization is not pushing a good person into doing a bad thing and to create an 
environment that supports any person to do the right thing.250 
 Considering the latest behavioral ethics empirical research through the lens of the ethical 
infrastructure model, this Article provides an evidence-based account of what works in compliance 
and ethics management. The ethical infrastructure model best captures, in an easy to comprehend 
form, what corporations should be managing to ensure they are creating an effective compliance 
and ethics program, which requires management of the organization’s culture. Thus, the OSG 
should be amended to include this model and give useful meaning to the phrase “organizational 
culture.” 
 The OSG currently states that “To have an effective compliance and ethics program . . . an 
organization shall—(1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; and (2) 
                                                             
249 Paine, supra note 138, at 113. 
250 It is important to remember that main cause of employee misconduct in many organizations is due to 
organizational environment. For example, KPMG surveys on integrity in the workplace regularly find that 
the “root causes of misconduct” in organizations are employees’ perceptions that their performance would 
be evaluated and rewarded based only on whether or not they met their targets, and not on the means used 
to achieve those targets. KPMG FORENSIC, INTEGRITY SURVEY 2013 12, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Integrity-Survey-2013-
O-201307.pdf.  This result has been consistent over multiple prior KPMG Integrity Surveys. Id. at 17. 
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otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law.”251 The following subsection then states that “(b)  Due diligence and the 
promotion of an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law within the meaning of subsection (a) minimally require the following: . .  
.”252 The OSG then lists the seven steps for a compliance and ethics program as amended in 
2004.253 Those seven steps define the formal system of an organization’s ethical infrastructure. To 
more meaningfully include the informal system and the ethical climate of the organization, the 
following two steps should be added: 
(8) Monitor the organization’s informal system of communication, surveillance, 
and sanctions, and promote an informal system that supports the goals of the 
compliance and ethics program. 
(9) Periodically assess organizational members’ perception of the organization’s 
ethical climate.254  
 
Ethical climate should be defined to include all three organizational climates in the ethical 
infrastructure model: ethics, respect, and procedural justice.255 In addition, the commentary to 
these amendments should make clear that the organization must investigate the possibility that 
                                                             
251 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a). 
252 Id. at § 8B2.1(b). 
253 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
254 For a similar proposal on an organization’s ethical climate (though defined differently than in this 
Article), see Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and their 
Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L. REV 1, 
61-62 (2003). 
255 See supra notes 165 to 175 and accompanying text.  
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different subunits within the organization may develop an informal system or ethical climate that 
is different from the rest of the organization.256 
 
B. Summary of Benefits from the Amendments 
 These additions would incorporate the ethical infrastructure model into the OSG and 
immediately give shape to the otherwise amorphous term of organizational culture. More 
specifically, it achieves two goals. First, it creates a framework that allows all interested parties to 
better understand corporate culture, to build upon the framework as our understanding deepens, 
and to share best practices for assessment and implementation as they develop.  Second, it grants 
legitimacy to the consideration of these issues. By explicitly stating and then setting out more 
clearly what is meant by an ethical corporate culture, it removes “ethics” from being viewed as a 
discussion of personal values and refocuses it on understanding human behavior through 
behavioral ethics. This change in perspective, along with its inclusion in the OSG, grants 
legitimacy to having a deeper discussion of an ethical corporate culture in the boardroom, in the 
CECO’s meetings with executives, and elsewhere throughout the organization. 
For boards of directors and executives, these changes would encourage them to consider 
those aspects of the corporate culture that behavioral ethics research has shown influence ethical 
behavior. By assessing the aspects of the informal organizational system identified above and the 
organization’s climates, and then responding to any negative influences identified, the organization 
would be forced to move away from any intentional or unintentional257 check-the-box mentality 
                                                             
256 See Baer, supra note 10, at 986-87 (discussing how organizations can develop multiple cultures based 
on geographic area or task-oriented divisions, for example). 
257 See Hess, supra note 13, at 1805-1806 (describing executives implementing compliance programs 
inconsistent with Paine’s idea of an integrity-based program, and therefore more likely to be a paper 
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towards compliance. With a clearer understanding of the issues, and the legitimacy granted by the 
OSG, the board will be more likely, and better able, to “exercise reasonable oversight with respect 
to the implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.”258 
 For CECOs, the inclusion of the ethical infrastructure model into the OSG will provide 
legitimacy to the work of the CECO. By including specific reference to the informal organizational 
system and the organization’s ethical climate, the OSG gives legitimacy—that CECO’s currently 
do not have259—to the CECO’s efforts to assess and provide recommendations for these aspects 
of the organization.  In addition, by making the infrastructure the responsibility of the CECO, it 
helps ensure that these types of assessments will get done. 
 For the DOJ, these changes will support prosecutors in assessing a corporation’s culture 
under the prosecution manual. The ethical infrastructure model provides direct guidance to 
prosecutors on the factors they should be considering, and provides a platform to build knowledge 
to use in future cases. As indicated above, if corporations know that prosecutors cannot distinguish 
“paper programs” from real programs, then corporations will devote more effort towards being 
able to blame the employee for any misconduct rather than effectively preventing the 
misconduct.260 In addition, prosecutors and corporations negotiating a settlement agreement will 
                                                             
program, as either misguided (the executives lack understanding of compliance programs and have 
priorities elsewhere) or misleading (the executives intentionally attempt to create only the appearance of an 
effective compliance program, but have no intention of supporting the full implementation of the program)). 
258 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(a). 
259 See supra notes 131 to 136 and accompanying text. 
260 See supra notes 81 to 85 and accompanying text (discussing Laufer’s view of corporations purchasing 
compliance as a form of insurance against receiving the blame for any misconduct by employees). 
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also be better able to structure the corporation’s responsibilities under the settlement and set the 
scope of the monitor’s role (if a monitorship is included in the agreement).261 
 
Conclusion 
The government and corporations continue to place faith in the ability of corporate 
compliance programs to reduce illegal and unethical behavior by managers and employees. 
Despite these efforts, the levels of observed unethical behavior by corporate employees has 
continued at a steady level over the past decade. In addition, corporate scandals continue to fill the 
business sections of newspapers. Although many (including the US Sentencing Commission 
through their amendments to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines) have recognized the 
importance of a corporation’s culture for controlling unethical behavior, there continues to be a 
wide-spread lack of understanding of the relationship between the compliance program and the 
corporation’s culture. To help correct the problem, and reduce the number of “paper programs,” 
this Article presents the ethical infrastructure model as a way to better understand the relationship 
between a corporation’s formal system (e.g., compliance program), informal system (e.g., group 
pressures and ethical norms at the local level), and the climate of the organization. Based on the 
most recent empirical research on behavioral and organizational ethics, this article presents the 
support for this model and highlights several key insights.  
 
 
 
                                                             
261 See Ford & Hess, supra note 16, at 731-32 (discussing the need to appropriately structure the scope of a 
monitor’s duties under a settlement agreement, including how, if at all, the monitor is to consider issues of 
corporate culture). 
